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Return of the Jihadis
John Arquilla
Published 4:00 am, Sunday, November 2, 2003
In his latest tape, Osama bin Laden -- or someone who does an awfully convincing imitation -- threatens suicide bombings inside the
United States. Is it a bluff or does al Qaeda really intend to stage new attacks on American soil?
The absence of terrorist assaults on America since Sept. 11, 2001, is due only in part to the efforts of our 90-nation counterterror
coalition. Yes, allied soldiers, police and spies around the world have landed some sharp blows against al Qaeda and its affiliates. But
these terror networks remain on their feet. They fight hard and are still very capable. It may be, then, that our adversaries have
compelling tactical, logistical and larger strategic reasons of their own for not striking the U.S. homeland these past two years.
The most obvious reason for not coming back to America is that jihadis ("holy warriors") just don't have to. Americans have already
come to them in Iraq and Afghanistan. And in great numbers, offering up many small-group targets on a daily basis. This situation
must be particularly attractive to terrorist groups that lack financial and other resources that give al Qaeda its truly global reach. The
simple fact is that terror, like much of politics, tends to be local, with most attacks conducted, by most groups, within shouting
distance of their homes. Al Qaeda is very much an anomaly.
And even a worldwide network like bin Laden's has probably decided to focus primarily on fighting where U.S. forces are deployed
abroad. It is far easier for terrorists to infiltrate across the remote, rugged border areas around Iraq and Afghanistan and blend into
their Muslim societies than it is to try to arm, transport and sustain operatives halfway around the world in the United States. Our
European allies' stalwart efforts to disrupt al Qaeda's financial and supply infrastructures have no doubt also made it much harder
and riskier for terrorists to think about launching another "deep strike" on our homeland.
Beyond these tactical and logistical considerations, there may also be a powerful strategic reason that has encouraged al Qaeda to
refrain from mounting major new attacks on America. It is that Osama bin Laden and his senior colleagues may believe that the
steady trickle of American casualties, so far from home -- in firefights and from remotely detonated bombs and suicide attacks --
undermines the American public's support for the Bush administration's war leadership.
If similar pinprick assaults were made within the United States, however, the relatively small amount of damage done would be far
outweighed by the rage and rekindled American resolve that would arise in the wake of small-scale attacks here.
Despite these reasons for focusing on small actions against U.S. troops overseas, al Qaeda may still feel impelled, under some
circumstances, to try to mount a major new attack on America. For example, if bin Laden acquired either a small nuclear weapon
(perhaps an old, Soviet-era "suitcase bomb") or a biological warfare capability, it would make sense for him to strike a target in the
United States. Such weapons, especially if al Qaeda had more than one, would quickly force us to negotiate -- at a minimum, to
capitulate to terrorist demands to withdraw our troops from Muslim countries.
Clearly, bin Laden doesn't yet have such a weapon of mass destruction --
though he has claimed to possess a nuclear weapon -- or he would swiftly put it to use. What al Qaeda probably does have, though, are
terrorist cells still active inside the United States. And the operatives in these cells could be directed, even without nukes, to
San Francisco 73° Sign In RegisterSearch
News Sports Business A&E Food Living Travel Columns Cars Jobs Real Estate
Find&Save
5/12/14, 2:52 PMReturn of the Jihadis - SFGate
Page 2 of 3http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Return-of-the-Jihadis-2579560.php
undertake something that would indeed cause massive disruption. Bin Laden's most recently released, CIA- authenticated audiotape
even calls for renewed "martyrdom attacks" in the United States.
There is some direct evidence of such planning by al Qaeda. For example, bin Laden disciple Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen,
was instructed, before his capture earlier this year, to use the cover afforded by his job as a truck driver to scout out the feasibility of
cutting the cables that hold up the Brooklyn Bridge.
The notion of dropping the bridge fits very neatly with al Qaeda's penchant for carefully timed spectaculars. Anything smaller-scale -
- sniping,
suicide mall bombings, etc. -- might simply serve to harden our will to keep on fighting.
But a true catastrophe, like taking down the Brooklyn Bridge, might spark a great deal of domestic dissension about why so much of
our effort is focused on Iraq while such grievous harm is being done at home. This would be a particularly piquant debate, given that
Saddam Hussein -- as far as anybody knows -- had absolutely nothing to do with 9/11.
Even in the case of a successful major new attack, bin Laden would still have to worry that it would not be a knockout blow like a
nuclear event. And though he may have underestimated the fury of the American response two years ago, he would be unlikely to do
so again. Or would he?
The key issue for us now is to try to understand the factors that may bear upon al Qaeda's decision making. We know that bin Laden
has a very keen sense of history, seeing himself as fighting the same kind of Crusaders that the great Muslim leader Saladin faced in
the 12th century.
Saladin confronted a dilemma quite similar to bin Laden's, as there came a point when he felt he had to choose between continuing a
war of skirmishes and small raids or mounting a major assault. His contemporary, Ibn al-Athir, tells us in his history of these events
that many of Saladin's advisers recommended continuing the war of attrition. He chose instead to risk all on a major attack at Hittin,
and won a spectacular victory.
All my instincts tell me that bin Laden will choose as Saladin once did, and launch a major attack as soon as his network is able to. He
won't unleash a swarm of small-scale suicide bombers around the United States. That would be a mistake that would just fill us with a
terrible thirst for revenge. Instead he'll find some prominent symbol of our progress and prosperity, and then try to strike at it in a
way that causes very heavy casualties -- and perhaps leads us to doubt both our leadership and our conduct of the war.
But major operations of this sort require the kind of preparation that inevitably leaves traces. If we can skillfully mine the data that
come our way,
we'll have a real chance to thwart al Qaeda, perhaps crippling this network for good in the process. To do this we don't need Big
Brother-style electronic snooping on the average American. We already have an ocean of intelligence data. More might actually slow
us down.
If we are to pre-empt al Qaeda's next big attack, what we really need --
right now -- is to network better. We have to break down walls between law enforcement, intelligence and military officials, as well as
between federal and local agencies and, finally, between ourselves and our foreign allies. A network in which information is shared
will ensure that vital intelligence already in the system is acted upon -- as should have been the case before Sept. 11.
Such organizational restructuring would take us from competing hierarchies to cooperating networks. It's a win-win solution, giving
us our best chance of heading off a new attack on American soil. But even if bin Laden shies away from striking at our homeland
again, having a network of our own will still vastly improve our ability to uproot his network, dispelling the shadow that terror has
managed to cast over this new millennium.
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